|Statement||Dani Rodrik, Tanguy van Ypersele.|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- working paper 7150, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7150.|
|Contributions||Ypersele, Tanguy van., National Bureau of Economic Research.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||19 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||19|
When countries differ in terms of capital mobility, further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge. Get this from a library! Capital mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination. [Dani Rodrik; Tanguy van Ypersele; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility. The discussion on tax coordination typically focuses on the question of the extent to which capital mobility drives national tax rates down, and on issues of institutional design regarding the selection of a cooperative tax rate at the international level (see for example Gordon, and Razin and Sadka, , Persson and Tabellini, provide a nice survey).Cited by: Rodrik D, van Ypersele T. Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict and International Tax Coordination. Journal of International Economics. ;54 (1).
Captial mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination. capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances. (C) Published by Author: D Rodrik and Tanguy Van Ypersele. When capital is internationally mobile, small differences in macroeconomic policies generate massive payments imbalances that cannot be managed successfully with the policy tools used during the Bretton Woods era. Monetary and fiscal policy coordination is needed to stabilize the international economy, but is difficult to by: 6. Rodrik Ypersele Particle Van () ArticleTitle Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict and International Tax Coordination Journal of International Economics 54 57–73 Occurrence Handle /S(00)XAuthor: Marco Mazzoli. International Economics Assignment Help, International capital mobility, International Capital Mobility is explained below: The case for the international capital mobility was most evidently articulated by MacDougal in He presented a framework including two countries, one abundant in the financial capital and th.
Book description. This book examines the coherent international tax regime that is embodied in both the tax treaty network and in domestic laws, and the way it forms a significant part of international law, both treaty based and by: Captial mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination by Rodrik, Dani & van Ypersele, Tanguy Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Tax competition with multinational ﬁrms and portfolio investment 16 Transfer prices and international income shifting 20 The ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms 22 3 Tax Coordination 33 Fiscal externalities and the welfare eﬀects of tax coordination 33 An example: Tax competition and the underprovision of public goods But fiscal competition leads to asymmetric capital taxation among countries and thus to a distortion on the international capital market. Two fiscal reforms are considered: the introduction of a minimum capital tax level and the imposition of a tax range, i.e. a minimum plus a maximum capital tax level.